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A CHRONIC CONCERN NO MORE: HOW
FEDERAL MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CAPS
WILL SURVIVE UNDER THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION
William J. Phelan, IV
There is a great rift between the legal and medical professions over
medical malpractice tort reform! In fact, many doctors not only
dislike lawyers, but also completely "mistrust the American adversarial
system of justice."2 Doctors and hospitals argue that there is a crisis in
America as high jury awards in medical liability cases are forcing
doctors to either practice "defensive medicine"3 or halt their practice
of medicine altogether. Conversely, lawyers see doctors as selfish and
unsympathetic towards their patients, especially those patients who
become victims of medical malpractice Trial lawyers believe that
their clients are entitled to the just compensation the judicial system
. The author wishes to thank Paul Thompson for his assistance in initiating and
developing the topic, as well as Brian Knestout, Henry Cohen, and the Volume
XXIII staff for their editorial support. Special thanks are in order for the author's
family, whose support during law school was second to none.
1. See John Gibeaut, The Med-Mal Divide, A.B.A. J., March 2005, at 40. See
also Kenneth Jost, Courts and the Law: Malpractice Blame Game, CO WEEKLY,
March 28, 2005, http://www.cq.com (last visited Aug. 25, 2005).
2. Gibeaut, supra note 1, at 40.
3. Defensive medicine is generally defined as the ordering of unnecessary and
excessive tests by doctors in order to avoid medical malpractice suits. It is
considered a factor in increasing costs for health care providers and thus the
insurance providers. See U.S. Cong., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, REP.
No. OTA-H-602, DEFENSIVE MEDICINE AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, 13 (1994),
available at http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ ota/ diskl/ 1994/ 9405/ 9405.PDF; but
see CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, LIMITING TORT LIABILITY FOR MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE 6 (2004), http://www.cbo.gov/ ftpdocs/ 49xx/ doc4968/01-08-
MedicalMalpractice.pdf [hereinafter CBO] (the practice of defensive medicine
may not translate into savings for rising health care costs).
4. See generally AM. MEDICAL ASS'N, AMERICA'S MEDICAL LIABILITY CRISIS
(2005), http://www.ama-assn.org/ amal/pub/ upload/mm/ 399/mlrtp.pdf (there are
numerous arguments that can be made in order to reform the medical malpractice
tort system, but these points will not be discussed.)
5. See Jost, supra note 1.
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allows. 6 Clearly, there is a schism between these professions, with
much at stake for both sides
Consequently, medical malpractice tort reform is also a charged
political issue. Since the 1970s, legislative bodies have come forward
to reform medical malpractice litigation." Legislatures have attempted
to ameliorate the medical malpractice insurance system via various
methods, including restrictions of lawyers' contingency fees, statutes of
limitations on medical malpractice claims and limits on punitive
damages.9  Another popular reform method, similar to punitive
damages restrictions, is capping noneconomic damages, i.e., damages
given for "pain and suffering.0 A number of states have passed
noneconomic damages caps that have attempted to reform their
medical malpractice tort systems." Accordingly, it is worthwhile to
6. See generally Press Release, Ass'n of Trial Lawyers of Am., The Truth
about Caps-They Don't Work (Sept. 22, 2006) (on file with author). There are
numerous arguments that can be made for not reforming the medical liability
system, however, these arguments will not be discussed here. In fact, it has been
frequently observed that both sides of the debate, always armed with "a welter of
wrenching anecdotes," have conflicting statistics. Kenneth Jost, Medical
Malpractice: Are Lawsuits Out of Control?, THE CQ RESEARCHER, vol. 13, no. 6, at
132-33 (2003) [hereinafter CQ RESEARCHER] (on file with author).
7. The driving forces behind these stakes are primarily financial. See infra
Part I.A.
8. Currently, only state legislatures have enacted policies to curb medical
malpractice litigation. The U.S. Congress has not passed any laws concerning
medical malpractice reform. See infra Parts I.B and I.C.
9. See Staff Of Joint Econ. Comm., 109th Cong., Liability For Medical
Malpractice: Issues And Evidence 20 (Comm. Print 2003), available at
http://www.house.gov/jec/tort/05-06-03.pdf [hereinafter Joint Econ. Comm.]; see
also Henry Cohen, Congressional Research Service, Medical Malpractice Liability
Reform: Legal Issues And Fifty-State Survey Of Caps On Punitive Damages And
Noneconomic Damages 3-11 (2005), available at http://shelby.senate.gov/
legislation/ MedicalMalpractice.pdf.
10. See COHEN, supra note 9, at 3-5 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND
KEETON ON TORTS § 31 (5th ed. 1984)). Noneconomic damages "refer to
monetary losses that result from an injury ... [and] consist primarily of damages
for pain and suffering" while punitive damages are given under "circumstances of
aggravation or outrage, such as spite or 'malice,' or a fraudulent or evil motive on
the part of the defendant .... See also CBO supra note 3, at 3 (listing definitions
for frequently used tort terms). See generally COHEN, supra note 9, app. at 12-19
(providing a chart of state laws that limit punitive and noneconomic damages in
medical malpractice cases).
11. Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice
Damage Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, app. at 496 (2005) (stating that currently
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focus on this type of reform. Some state and federal courts have struck
down these caps as unconstitutional, while other courts have found
these caps constitutionally valid."2 State damages caps have been
examined in light of such issues as equal protection, due process,
separation of powers, and the right to a jury trial.'3
In the past several sessions, the United States Congress has
attempted to enact federal damages caps specifically for medical
malpractice cases. 14 The 109th Congress is no exception; members
have introduced numerous bills on this subject.' The language of
these bills is similar to that from previous sessions, suggesting that the
twenty four of the fifty states have damages caps specifically for medical
malpractice cases and listing statutory citations for each law). See also William R.
Paget, Comment, Damage Limitation in Medical Malpractice Actions: Necessary
Litigation or Unconstitutional Deprivation, 55 S.C. L. REV. 215, 218 (2003). It is
important to note that a limitation on noneconomic damages is different from
abolishing a state's collateral-source rule. The collateral-source rule is the
"doctrine that if an injured party receives compensation for its injuries from a
source independent of the tortfeasor, the payment should not be deducted from
the damages that the tortfeasor must pay." BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 256-57 (7th
ed. 1999). See e.g., Coburn v. Agustin, 629 F. Supp. 983, 997 (D.Kan. 1985)
(striking down a state's ban on their collateral-source rule under equal protection
concerns).
12. See infra, Part I.B.
13. See Michael Cetra, Comment, Damage Control: Statutory Caps on Medical
Malpractice Claims, State Constitutional Challenges, and Texas' Proposition 12, 42
Duo. L. REv. 537, 543-550 (2004).
14. See Adam D. Glassman, The Imposition of Federal Caps in Medical
Malpractice Liability Actions: Will they Cure the Current Crisis in Healthcare?, 37
AKRON L. REV. 417,421-31 (2004).
15. See e.g., Healthy America Act of 2005, S. 4, 109th Cong. (2005); Help
Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare Act, H.R. 5, 109th Cong.
(2005); S. 354, HEALTH Act of 2005, 109th Cong. (2005). There are also bills that
deal with medical malpractice caps for specific areas of practice such as
gynecology, see S. 366, 109th Cong. (2005), or pregnancy and trauma, see S. 367,
109th Cong. (2005). One measure allows the Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services to provide grants to states that provide and foster
"alternatives to current tort litigation." S. 1337, 109th Cong. (2005). This flurry of
bills shows that medical malpractice tort reform is a priority of the Republican-
controlled 109th Congress (and the White House). See Rebecca Adams, Issues
Redux: The Uninsured, Drug Prices and Medical Malpractice Awards, CQ TODAY,
Jan. 7, 2005, available at http://www.cq.com (last visited Aug. 25, 2005) [hereinafter
Adams, Issue Redux].
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general cap policies advanced in this session of Congress will be
utilized by those who support such reform in the foreseeable future.
16
Due to the fact that none of these bills have become law, the federal
court system has not yet constitutionally analyzed a national law that
places caps on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases.
Nonetheless, the same constitutional concerns that states have had
with their caps17 are also applicable to federal legislation.'8 In fact, the
bills now being put forth contain several provisions that would be
challenged as unconstitutional by individuals who oppose tort reform.
This Comment will analyze recently proposed federal damages caps
exclusively in light of the Equal Protection Clause (EPC) of the United
States Constitution.'9 Considering modern Supreme Court (Court)
jurisprudence on the EPC, a national cap on noneconomic jury
damages in medical malpractice cases would be constitutional under
EPC analysis by the Court. In order to properly perform this analysis,
Part I provides a general history of the medical malpractice issue,
establishing the context of the issue at hand. Section A presents the
factors involved in the debate that have driven reform efforts. Section
B gives a selection of state cap laws and how state courts have had
varied reactions to the laws with regard to equal protection. Section C
takes additional state cap laws and shows a more uniform response by
the federal courts towards these laws concerning equal protection.
Part II deals with the contemporary role of the United States Congress
in medical malpractice reform. Section A reviews previously failed
federal attempts to apply a uniform cap for noneconomic damages. In
turn, Section B explains current federal medical malpractice reform
proposals. Part III then shows how Congress' proposals will have no
problems surviving scrutiny under the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
16. Compare Healthy America Act, § 104(b) with H.R. 1195, § 204(a), 104th
Cong. (1995). It is, therefore, worthwhile to use such frequently utilized cap
language as an example in this Comment.
17. See infra, note 47 and accompanying text.
18. A federal cap could have additional unique problems with the 10th
Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. X, and the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, because medical malpractice tort reform may be an issue reserved to the
states. See Paget, supra note 11, at 226-27.
19. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that no
state will "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause also applies to
the federal government through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
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for the Equal Protection Clause.20 Such a conclusion first looks at
Supreme Court case law relevant to damages caps and then shows how
the Court's jurisprudence in this area poses no equal protection clause
concerns. This outcome should be reached despite the lack of
concurrence by state supreme courts.
PART I: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORM: CAUSES, ISSUES, AND
STATE RESPONSES
Origins of an Insurance Debacle
Doctors have been held liable for torts while practicing medicine
throughout the history of American common law.2' Malpractice cases
were extremely rare before 1835, especially if anything but death
resulted from the doctor's negligence.22 It was not until the late 1830s,
when orthopedic injuries led to an increase of lawsuits, that the first
23malpractice crisis has been cited. It was not until the 1970s, however,
that there was a noticeable upsurge of medical malpractice lawsuits.24
20. Others who have written on this topic have expressed concerns that the
Supreme Court would have trouble saying that such a cap would be found
constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. See Kevin J. Gfell, Note, The
Constitutional and Economic Implications of a National Cap on Non-Economic
Damages in Medical Malpractice Actions, 37 IND. L. REV. 773, 779 (2005).
(claiming that those who draft a federal noneconomic damages cap will have a
hard time finding evidence that will enable the law to pass the Court's rational
basis review). This piece takes the position that the evidence is more than ample,
see infra Part III; the purpose of this piece is to assure lawmakers and academics
that they should have no such concern.
21. See David Studdert et al., Medical Malpractice, NEW ENG. J. MED. 284
(2004). The first reported case in the federal appeals circuit was in 1974. KENNETH
ALLEN DE VILLE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 7
(New York University Press 1990).
22. See DE VILLE, supra note 21, at 7-9.
23. CQ RESEARCHER, supra note 6, at 139. The term medical malpractice
crisis can have varied meanings, especially when comparing the conditions of the
19th to the 20th centuries. Today, however, there is some consensus that a crisis
occurs when, ultimately, citizens cannot receive proper health care. See infra note
37.
24. See Cetra, supra note 13, at 538; Padget, supra note 11, at 217. Insurance
premiums before the 1970s, however, were on a sharp increase. Between World
War II and 1968, insurance premiums increased three times faster than the rate of
inflation. James Reuter, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, REP. No. 84-114
EPW, DEFENSIVE MEDICINE AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 8 (1984) (on file with
author) (citing a report by the AMA Committee on Professional Liability).
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Before this time, "[v]ery little [was] known about the malpractice
liability insurance industry., 25  Several professors from Harvard's
School of Public Health and School of Medicine provide a summation
of the reasons for the rise in medical malpractice suits in the 1970s:
Judges discarded rules that had traditionally posed obstacles
to litigation. For example, most jurisdictions rolled back
charitable immunity for hospitals. Courts also moved toward
national standards of care and abandoned strict
interpretations of the "locality rule," which had required
plaintiffs to find expert witnesses within the defendant's
immediate practice community. At the same time, expansion
of doctrines such as informed consent and res ipsa loquitur
(the rule that certain events, such as the retention of
instruments after surgery, carry an inference of negligence)
paved new pathways to the courtroom. The more plaintiff-
friendly environment fostered by these changes altered the
cost-benefit calculus for plaintiffs' attorneys, leading to a
steady growth in litigation.
From these developments, an unfortunate chain of events
materialized. With more opportunities for malpractice victims to bring
their cases to court, an increasing number of plaintiffs were winning
21their malpractice claims . Increased victories in courts forced many
insurance companies to pull out of the medical malpractice market.'
At this point, a "crisis of availability" developed, where numerous
doctors and healthcare providers were unable to attain insurance with
only a few insurance carriers available in the market. 29  State
legislatures responded with various tort and insurance reform
initiatives which temporarily solved the problem.30
25. This lack of knowledge is due in part to a lack of data from the industry.
See Rueter, supra note 24, at 15-16.
26. Studdert et al., supra note 21 (citations omitted). See also PAUL C.
WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL (Harvard University Press 1991).
27. See Studdert et al., supra note 21.
28. Cetra, supra note 13, at 538; Paget, supra note 11, at 217. See generally
Baird Webel, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
INSURANCE: AN ECONOMIC INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF HISTORICAL
EXPERIENCE 8-9 (2005), available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/ marshall/
crsreports/ crsdocuments/ RL3188601192005.pdf (explaining specific developments
of the insurance market, including the insurers involved in the market).
29. Cetra, supra note 13, at 538; Paget, supra note 11, at 217.
30. Studdert et al., supra note 21. Specifically, for example, "[l]egislatures
established quasi-public bodies called joint underwriting associations to serve as
insurers of last resort, special state patient-compensation funds were introduced to
2006]
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In the 1980s, market forces took hold of the medical malpractice
insurance system, where the large size of the market coupled with only
a few carriers permitted the few remaining insurance carriers to
increase their rates. This spike in premiums resulted in a new crisis of
affordability.3  In response, state legislatures relied more on
noneconomic and punitive damages caps to reduce the risk and cost
insurers were sustaining.32 After states instituted the damages caps,
there was little growth in premium rates for the health care field up
until the mid-1990s.
33
Recently, however, rates have drastically increased.34 Between 2000
and 2002, premiums for all physicians have increased by fifteen
35percent. Put in a broader context, premiums doubled in the ten years
absolve commercial insurers of responsibility for specified dollar portions of
malpractice payments, and public reinsurance mechanisms were established to fill
gaps in the underwriting market." Id. at 284.
31. Cetra, supra note 13, at 538; Paget, supra note 11, at 217. This new crisis
could also be attributed to a steady increase, in the 1970s and 1980s, in the
frequency and severity of medical malpractice suits. In the 1960s, one in every 100
doctors had a malpractice claim filed against him or her. That increased to
thirteen per 100 at the end of the 1980s. Awards have also increased drastically in
this period. Additional factors during this time were revenue lag for doctors and
cost-cutting measures enacted by the health care industry to curtail the national
health care budget. See PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL, 2-7
(Harvard Univ. Press 1991).
32. See Studdert et al., supra note 21.
33. See id. More insurance providers were entering the market, thus leading to
a soft market and lower rates. WEBEL, supra note 28, at 9. A soft market is
"characterized by slowly rising premium rates, less stringent underwriting
standards, expanded coverage and strong competition among insurers." GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE, MULTIPLE FACTORS
HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO INCREASED PREMIUM RATES, GAO-03-702, 33 (2003),
available at http://www.gao.gov/ new.items/ d03702.pdf (hereinafter GAO,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE RATES]; see also WEBEL, supra note 28, at 4.
34. See GAO, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE RATES, supra note 33, at
3-5; but see Meg Fletcher, State Tort Reform Measures, Loss Control Programs
Bring Stabilization to Medical Malpractice Market, 39 BUS. INSURANCE, Nov. 14,
2005, available at 2005 WLNR 18676837 (claiming insurance rates are leveling off).
There are numerous factors that have increased the premium rates. Id. at 4.
These factors are too many to discuss here. Additionally, both sides in the debate
have their own lists as to what specifically resulted in the rate growths. See supra
notes 4, 6. See also CBO, supra note 3, at 3-5. There are certain specialty practices
that have seen disproportionate median rate increases. For example general
surgeons have had their rates tripled. JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 9, at 6.
35. CBO, supra note 3, at 1.
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leading to 2001.36 There is also evidence that jury awards in medical
malpractice cases have increased in the past several years. For
instance, the U.S. Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Statistics
reported that despite a decrease in the estimated median damages
awards in the mid-1990s, there has been a 164% increase in that
number between 2002 and 2003 to $1.35 million." Such figures help
explain why the American Medical Association has identified twenty
states as existing in a "medical liability crisis. '  Both sides in the
reform debate acknowledge that health care costs have been
36. This was an average increase of 8.1 percent a year. JOINT ECON. COMM.,
supra note 9, at 1 ("In 2001, total premiums for medical malpractice insurance
topped $21 billion .... )
37. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice
Statistics, Federal Tort Trials and Verdicts, 2002-03 11 (2005) [hereinafter BJS],
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ bjs/pub/ pdf/fttv03.pdf. See also Press
Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Civil Justice
Survey of State Courts, 2001, table 3 (April 2004), available at http://ojp.usdoj.gov/
bjs/pub/pdf/mmtvlc01.pdf (finding a forty-one percent increase in the median final
amount awarded to plaintiffs between 1992 and 2001). Another considerably
higher figure shows a 176 percent increase in awards between 1994 and 2001.
JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 9, at 1, 7 (citing a study from Jury Verdict
Research, Current Award Trends in Personal Injury: 2002 Edition (Horsham PA:
LRP Publications 2003), at 18). This study also reports that fifty-four percent of
awards between 2000 and 2001 were at least one million dollars. Id. at 8. These
figures appear even more astronomical when compared to the case of Dr. Asabel
Humphrey, who, in 1829 had to pay $500 in damages for an irreparable injury to
someone's arm. Dr. Humphrey was extremely shocked at the award and "declared
that the case should 'excite the astonishment of every medical man."' DE VILLE,
supra note 21, at 1.
38. These states are: Washington, Oregon, Nevada, Wyoming, Missouri,
Illinois, Arkansas, Mississippi, Kentucky, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, West
Virginia, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Connecticut, New York, Rhode Island,
and Massachusetts. AM. MEDICAL ASS'N, AMERICA'S MEDICAL LIABILITY CRISIS:
A NATIONAL VIEW (2005), http://www.ama-assn.org/ amal/ pub/upload/un/
450/med liab mayo5.pdf. There are also twenty-four additional states who are
nearing a crisis. AM. MEDICAL ASS'N, AMERICA'S MEDICAL LIABILITY CRISIS,
supra note 4. A crisis condition, according to the American Medical Association,
is when escalating jury awards and settlements (along with the costs of taking on
medical malpractice suits) force insurance premiums to rise. In turn, this may lead
to, inter alia, the closing of trauma centers, deterrence of young physicians from
high-risk specialties, and a decrease in patient access to care. Current Issues
Related to Medical Liability Reform Before the Subcomm. on Health of H. Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. 2 (2005) (statement of the Am. Medical
Ass'n).
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increasing;3 9 however, the causes of these high costs are in dispute.4
Nevertheless, states have attempted to legislatively address the
problem of inaccessible medical care. Such attempts are addressed
below in Sections B and C.
State Damages Caps, Equal Protection, and State Courts
Starting in the 1970s, states began reacting to the crises of
availability and affordability.' Tort reform measures were varied.
Some states instituted controls on the insurance market such as the
creation of trusts and funds for victims of medical malpractice.42
Additionally, states have tried to limit such variables as damages,
attorneys' fees, and joint and several liability, in order to reduce
insurers' costs. 43  Of all these solutions, however, noneconomic
damages caps have been the states' "primary vehicle. " Since 1975,
39. See Am. Medical Ass'n, America's Medical Liability Crisis, supra note 4;
Cf. Ass'n of Trial Lawyers of Am., Debunking the Top 5 Myths About Medical
Malpractice (2005),
http://www.atla.org/pressroom/FACTS/medmaIrop5Myths.aspx (responding to an
assertion that medical malpractice claims lead to rising health costs, the
Association of Trial Lawyers of America cites the Congressional Budget Office
report, supra note 3, stating that less than two percent of total health care costs are
from such claims. By claiming that medical malpractice claims have not led to cost
inflation, this argument assumes that costs are high.).
40. Those against reform claim, among other things, that it is not medical
malpractice claims that force premiums to rise, citing reports that damage caps
have not affected insurance premiums. Id. See also WEISS RATINGS INC.,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CAPS THE IMPACT OF NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGE CAPS ON
PHYSICIAN PREMIUMS, CLAIMS PAYOUT LEVELS, AND AVAILABILITY OF
COVERAGE (2003), http://www.weissratings.com/MedicalMalpractice.pdf
[hereinafter WEISS STUDY]. Those for reform claim just the opposite. See AM.
MEDICAL Ass'N, AMERICA'S MEDICAL LIABILITY CRISIS, supra note 4. As seen,
there are valid numbers on both sides about the insurance system. It truly "is a
complex blend of competing studies and economic models, points and
counterpoints." John Cochran, 'Tort Reform' Battle: A Simple Case of Complexity,
CQ WEEKLY, Jan. 31, 2005, http://www.cq.com (last visited on Aug. 25, 2005). This
Comment is not a policy analysis, but rather a constitutional analysis of proposals
to fix the insurance system.
41. See supra notes 26, 28 and accompanying text.
42. WEBEL, supra note 28, at 10. See supra note 27.
43. WEBEL, supra note 28, at 11.
44. WEISS STUDY, supra note 40, at 5.
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nearly half the states have established caps on noneconomic damages.45
Many of these caps have been challenged in their respective state court
systems.46 As will be discussed in the examples of Nebraska, New
Hampshire, and Wisconsin, some of these caps have been upheld and
some have been struck down as a violation of equal protection.4
To give proper context, under equal protection examination, a court
will generally apply one of three tests. The first, the rational
relationship test (or rational basis review), requires that a classification
made by the law must have a rational relationship to a legitimate
constitutional end of government." There is also the strict scrutiny test
that applies only when a fundamental right or a suspect class is
affected. 49 Finally, there is the rarely used intermediate level of review,
where there must be a substantial relationship with an important
government end.50 In all of the cases to follow, the victimized party
45. Id. The amounts that states cap off damages vary from $250,000 to $1
million. Id. See also COHEN, supra note 9, app. at 12-19 (providing a chart of each
state's caps). Some states have different caps for certain situations, like emergency
services or whether the plaintiff has medical insurance; furthermore, some state
constitutions expressly prohibit caps on damages for those who are injured or die.
46. See infra pp. 8-12.
47. This Comment will only deal with laws that have been examined under
equal protection clauses; however, other constitutional issues have been involved
when determining the state constitutionality of a damage cap, see supra note 13
and accompanying text. For example, the Supreme Court of Nebraska found
Nebraska's cap on jury awards in medical malpractice cases, NEB. REV. STAT. §44-
2825 (2005), to be constitutional with respect to concerns of equal protection,
separation of powers, right to a trial by jury, open courts and right to a remedy and
special legislation. Gourley v. Nebraska Methodist Health Sys., 663 N.W. 2d 43
(Neb. 2003). See also Cetra, supra note 13, at 540-48 (summarizing the Nebraska
Supreme Court's discussion and decision on each of the aforementioned issues);
Gfell, supra note 20 (providing an excellent discussion of state caps and the various
state and federal constitutional issues that are entailed). Each state constitution
(and the rights granted therein) is unique; therefore, some state constitutions may
give rise to different constitutional challenges.
48. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, Constitutional Law § 14.3, at
687 (7th ed. 2004).
49. Id. at 687. A suspect class contains traits that "seem[] to contravene
established constitutional principles so that any use of the classification may be
deemed 'suspect'." Id. at 688. Race, for example, is typically cited as a
qualification for determining whether a class is suspect. Id.
50. Id. at 689. Therefore, if the party challenging the law is not in a suspect
class or does not have a fundamental right involved by the law, the court will
default to rational basis review. Under the strict scrutiny test, a law must have a
necessary means to a compelling end of government. In comparison, rational basis
2006]
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sought strict scrutiny review because the cap would be more vulnerable
under equal protection clause analysis and thus more prone to being
struck down. Under strict scrutiny, the state legislature is given less
deference in its decision-making ability. This lack of deference usually
shows that the cap has no compelling end and creates an
unconstitutional classification that the court must strike down.51
Nebraska
Beginning in 1976, Nebraska began to place limits on the amount
recoverable when a patient is injured or dies.52 Currently, if one is a
victim of medical malpractice in Nebraska, one is not entitled to more
than $1.75 million in noneconomic damages. This law was applied by
a Nebraska district court in a 2003 case involving Colin Gourley and
his parents.54 Colin Gourley was born with brain damage and cerebral
palsy. His parents sued an OB/GYN group claiming that the disease
that gave him his ailments was a result of the group's improper
monitoring.5 The jury awarded the Gourleys $5.6 million, but the trial
court initially reduced the verdict to $1.25 million.56 After the
Gourleys and the OB/GYN group both moved for new trials, on
different grounds,57 the court reversed its earlier decision and found
review gives deference to the legislature in formulating the law, while strict
scrutiny calls for judicial determination of a law. Id.
51. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 48, § 14.3. All of these tests have
been developed by the Supreme Court, however, state courts and the lower federal
courts have utilized them as well. See also infra Parts II.C, III.
52. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 44-2825 (2004).
53. Id. § 44-2825(1)(d). The cap amount is tiered according to when the tort
occurred. Id. at § 44-2825(1). As time goes on, the cap increases (i.e. tort
occurring between January 1, 1984, and December 31, 1992, has a cap of $1
million). Id. at § 44-2825(1)(b). Of particular note is that the cap is not specific to
noneconomic damages- it includes any type of damage reward given. Id. at § 44-
2825.
54. Gourley v. Neb. Methodist Health Sys. 663 N.W.2d 43, 56 (Neb. 2003).
55. Id. at 55-56.
56. At the time of the Gourley's injury in 1993, the cap was only $1,250,000.
Id. at 56.
57. The Gourleys moved for a new trial because the cap violated their rights,
including equal protection, life liberty and the pursuit of happiness and due
process. The OB/GYN group moved for a new trial because of alleged procedural
errors at the trial. Gourley, 663 N.W.2d at 56.
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the cap in violation of the Nebraska constitution's equal protection
clause.58
The Nebraska Supreme Court applied the traditional test to see
which equal protection review was applicable, rational basis review or
strict (heightened) scrutiny review. 9 If a suspect class or fundamental
right was involved, then the former was to be used. The Gourleys
contended that "a heightened level of review should be applied to
[their] case because the cap affects fundamental rights such as the right
to a jury trial, full remedy, property, and medical care." 6° They also
believed that those with disabilities that qualify for damages above the
cap are considered a suspect class.6' Both of the Gourleys'
classifications were triggers recognized by the court to require strict
scrutiny review. 62 The Nebraska Supreme Court disagreed, however.
The court distinguished the fundamental right of access to the courts
from that of a limitation on the plaintiff's potential recovery. The
Gourleys were in the latter category and therefore had no claim to a
fundamental right.63  Furthermore, the court did not believe that
"plaintiffs with damages awards over the cap are a [traditional] suspect
class." 64
Therefore, the Nebraska Supreme Court performed a rational basis
review, and deferred to the legislature's rationale. It held that the
legislature's goals of reducing health care costs and encouraging access
to medical care were legitimate ones. 6' The court reasoned that thedamages cap was a rational method to achieve these goals. 66
58. Id. The Nebraska Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor be denied
equal protection of the laws." NEB. CONST. art. I, § 3.
59. Gourley, 663 N.W.2d at 70-71.
60. Id. at 71.
61. Id. The Gourleys therefore attempted to portray themselves as falling into
both categories that call for strict scrutiny. If the law were to be reviewed under
strict scrutiny, there would have been a better chance that it would have to be
struck down under the state's equal protection clause, NEB. CONST. art. I, § 3.
62. Gourley, 663 N.W.2d, at 70.
63. Id. at 71.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 72.
66. It also did not violate any other portion of the Nebraska Constitution. See
supra note 43. Other state supreme courts have upheld their caps under a rational
basis test. See, e.g., Robinson v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., 414 S.E.2d
877 (W. Va. 1991); Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio 1991) (the cap was
struck down as unconstitutional under due process concerns, however); Butler v.
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New Hampshire
The State of New Hampshire enacted a damages cap of $250,000 in
671977. In Carson v. Maurer, the cap was challenged in the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire under the state and federal equal protection
clauses. 68  The plaintiffs asserted that the statute "distinguishes
between medical malpractice victims whose non-economic loss exceeds
$250,000 and those whose non-economic loss is $250,000 or less...., 69
This differentiation denied equal protection of the law for those whose
noneconomic losses exceeded the $250,000 cap. The plaintiffs further
contended that such a classification infringed upon the fundamental
right to be compensated for personal injuries.0
The New Hampshire Supreme Court did find a classification, 7 but
did not find this class distinction to be suspect, nor did it believe that
the affected right was fundamental.73 Although it found strict scrutiny
inapplicable, the court stated that the rights involved with medical
74malpractice awards were too important for rational basis review.
Consequently, the New Hampshire Supreme Court invoked the
intermediate review test, requiring that the "challenged classifications
are reasonable and have a fair and substantial relation to the object of
the legislation. ' '75 This time, however, the noneconomic damages cap
did not pass this test. The classification, by limiting the awards given
to those who are most injured, did not have a substantial relation to
Flint Goodrich Hospital of Dillard University, 607 So. 2d 517 (La. 1992); Pulliam v.
Coastal Emergency Services of Richmond, Inc., 509 S.E.2d (Va. 1999); Scholz v.
Metropolitan Pathologists, 851 P.2d 901 (Colo. 1993).
67. "[C]ompensation for non-economic losses shall in no event exceed the sum
of $250,000." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:7(II) (2005).
68. 424 A.2d 825, 829-30 (N.H. 1980). The case before the New Hampshire
Supreme Court was a consolidation of actions from the state's district and superior
courts as well as the U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire. Id. at
829.
69. Id. at 830.
70. The statute, therefore, would have to advance a compelling government
interest to remain intact. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 831.
73. Id. at 830.
74. Carson, 424 A.2d at 830.
75. Id. at 831 (emphasis added by author). The court recognized that the goal
of the legislation was "to codify and stabilize the law governing medical
malpractice actions and to improve the availability of adequate liability insurance
for health care providers at reasonable cost." Id. at 830.
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the goal of reducing insurance rates.76  Specifically, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court found that these large awards were only a
fraction of the total insurance premium costs. 77 Furthermore, these
caps had no relation to decreasing the amount of nonmeritorious
claims, an alleged factor in the rising cost of insurance.8  Unlike
Nebraska, the New Hampshire Supreme Court struck down the
damages cap. Its differing conclusion was most likely due to the fact
that the New Hampshire Supreme Court applied an intermediate,
79
rather than a rational basis, standard of review.
Wisconsin
Added to this scattered analysis of damages caps is Ferdon v.
Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, one of the more recent state
court decisions on the issue. 80 The case involved Wisconsin's $350,000
state cap for noneconomic damages.81
Matthew Ferdon was born with a paralyzed and deformed right arm
due to doctor negligence during his birth. s2 The jury, giving Ferdon a
life expectancy of sixty-nine years, awarded him $10,000 a year.83
Ferdon's judgment was reduced significantly by a county circuit court,
as per the state cap.8' The plaintiffs challenged the law under the state
constitution's EPC clause.85 The Wisconsin Supreme Court did not
believe that those whose damages are limited by the cap constitute a
suspect class; nor did such a group have any fundamental rights
affected by the cap. 86 Therefore, the court applied a rational basis
76. Id. at 836.
77. Id. (citing Jenkins, California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act:
An Equal Protection Challenge, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 829, 951 (1979)).
78. Id. at 837.
79. North Dakota also used an intermediate test that required a "close
correspondence between statutory classification and legislative goals." Arneson v.
Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 133 (N.D. 1978) (quoting Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d
771 (N.D. 1974)).
80. 701 N.W.2d 440, (Wis. 2005).
81. See WIS. STAT. §§ 655.017, 893.55(4)(d), 895.04(4)(2000-01). The cap, like
most state caps, is adjusted annually for inflation. Id. § 893.55(4)(d).
82. Ferdon, 701 N.W.2d at 446. The suit before the Wisconsin Supreme Court
actually was between Ferdon and several private companies that sought to reduce
the damages pursuant to the law. Id.
83. Id.
84. The court decreased Ferdon's award to $5,900 a year. Id.
85. Id. at 455. See also WIs. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
86. Ferdon, 701 N.W.2d at 457.
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81review. Much like the Carson case, the Ferdon court did not find a
relationship between the cap and its goal of lowering insurance
premiumsf What is surprising about Ferdon, however, is that it did
89not find a rational relation under such a low level of review.
The Wisconsin legislature has recently resurrected the issue, passing
another $350,000 cap on noneconomic damages. 90 The cap was vetoed
by the governor who wanted to avoid another rebuking of the cap by
the state's supreme court.9'
When looking at the three state court examples above, it is evident
that state courts have approached the constitutionality of these
damages caps in a variety of ways. This area of law appears to be very
unpredictable on the state level.92 Fortunately, federal district and
circuit courts have applied a more uniform response concerning state
caps on medical malpractice awards.
State Damages Caps, Equal Protection and the Federal Courts
Federal district and appellate courts have also entertained numerous
medical malpractice cases.9' These courts have a sizeable body of case
87. At first, it appeared that Ferdon has an uphill battle under rational basis
review. In fact, the court noted that the burden is on Ferdon and it is presumed
that the law is constitutional. Id. at 457-58. Specifically, the court stated, "[A]
statute will be upheld against an equal protection challenge if a plausible policy
reason exists for the classification and the classification is not arbitrary in relation
to the legislative goal." Id. at 489.
88. Especially by preventing doctors from practicing defensive medicine. Id. at
489.
89. Carson, 424 A.2d at 831, had a higher level of review in looking for a
substantial relationship. The Ferdon court focused on defensive medicine as the
key element that has led to an increase in insurance costs. It cited three legislative
agency studies that showed no affect of caps on whether doctors practiced
defensive medicine. See Ferdon, 701 N.W.2d, at 487-89.
90. See Tony Anderson, Wisconsin Senate Passes Medical Malpractice Cap,
Wis. L. J., Nov. 16, 2005, available at 2005 WL 18675493.
91. See Stacy Forster & Derrick Nunnally, Doyle Vetoes Medical Malpractice
Caps Limits Too Similar to Those Overturned by Court, Government Says,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Dec. 3, 2005, available at 2005 WL 19517568.
92. There is a "split of opinion in state courts when these statutes are attacked
on varying state [and federal] constitutional grounds." Cetra, supra note 13, at
555. These inconsistencies are also used as justification for federal action.
Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 with WIs CONST. art. I, § 1 and N.H. CONST.
pt. I, arts. 2, 12 and NEB. CONST. art. I, § 3.
93. Concerning the district level, between 1990 and 2003, U.S. district courts
have handled 1,685 medical malpractice trials. BJS, supra note 37, at 9
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law analyzing state caps on noneconomic damages. 94 The vast majority
of these cases, especially those at the circuit level, have upheld the caps
as constitutional under both the state and federal equal protection
clauses.95 Examples, in chronological order, from the Ninth, Fourth
and Sixth Circuits will showcase how the circuit courts have handled
the matter.
Ninth Circuit
California instituted a $250,000 damages cap in 1975.96 In 1981, Scott
Hoffman underwent treatment for a lacerated tendon in his finger at a
veteran's hospital in California; as a result of the treatment, he
suffered a brain injury that left him permanently paralyzed. 97 The
District Court for the Central District of California granted him one
million dollars in noneconomic damages, declaring the California cap
98unconstitutional for violating equal protection guarantees.
94. Some of these cases reach the federal courts because federal laws are
involved, see e.g., Lucas v. U.S., 807 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1986) (Federal Torts Claim
Act); Owen v. U.S., 935 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Botsford General
Hospital, 419 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005) (Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
Labor Act); see also 28 U.S.C. §1331 (1980). The federal courts take other cases
involving state caps because federally protected rights, specifically the right to
equal protection under the laws, are similar to state protected rights see Davis v.
Omitowoju, 883 F.2d 1155 (3rd Cir. 1989) (Seventh Amendment, right to a jury
trial).
95. There are some infrequent instances when a district court has held that
state damages caps are unconstitutional under the equal protection clause. See
e.g., Waggoner v. Gibson, 647 F.Supp. 1102 (N.D. Tex. 1986) (striking down a
$500,000 Texas cap under rational basis review), overruled by Lucas v. U.S., 807
F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1986).
96. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2(b) (West 2005). This cap was part of one of the
first medical malpractice tort reform initiatives, the Medical Injury Compensation
Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA). Melissa G. Gregory, Note, Capping Noneconomic
Damages in Medical Malpractice Suits is not the Panacea of the "Medical Liability
Crisis," 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1031, 1036 (2005). Some cite MICRA as a
success sort for noneconomic damages caps because it has survived over thirty
years of constitutional analysis, see JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 9, at 19.
Others feel that it has not worked at all, see Glassman, supra note 14, at 458-60.
97. Hoffman v. U.S., 767 F.2d 1431, 1433 (9th Cir. 1985).
98. The action was brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which utilizes
the law of the state where the tort occurred. Id. It relied on Carson's rationale for
finding the law unconstitutional. Id. Oddly enough, the district court did not note
whether the cap ran afoul of the state or federal guarantee to equal protection. Id.
at note 1.
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In responding to the typical EPC arguments discussed above, the
Ninth Circuit turned towards the United States Constitution's Equal
Protection clause; it failed to see any suspect class or fundamental right
involved in the case; thus, it had no reason to use strict scrutiny and
applied the rational basis test.9 In applying rational basis review, the
court found that there was a "plausible reason" for California to enact
the law; the court gave deference to the California legislature's
decision that caps could decrease premiums because excessive jury
awards were responsible for driving up premiums.'0° Much like some
of the state supreme courts, the Ninth Circuit did not question the
legitimacy of what the legislature asserted. Under rational basis
review it simply looked for this "plausible reason."
Fourth Circuit
Currently, Virginia has a $1.8 million cap on all damages given in a
medical malpractice trial.10' This damages cap was challenged by
Helen and Roger Boyd, whose daughter was left with mental
retardation and cerebral palsy due to a doctor's negligence during her
birth.' O° The Boyds and their daughter received over $2.5 million in
damages each; however the statute reduced their total recovery to
$750,000 each.' 3
In Boyd v. Bulala, the Fourth Circuit rejected the Boyd's claim that
the cap violated their federal Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. In a
succinct opinion, the court agreed with the Supreme Court of Virginia,
which heard the case earlier that "the cap on liability bears a
reasonable relation to a valid legislative purpose- the maintenance of
adequate health care services in the Commonwealth of Virginia."'10 It
rejected strict scrutiny review because the law did "not violate a
fundamental right or create a suspect classification."'0'5 In coming to
this conclusion, the court commented on the nature of damages cap
legislation: the law, according to the court, was simply an economic
regulation that should routinely be given rational basis review.'06 By
classifying damages caps as an economic regulation, there was no need
99. Id. at 1436.
100. Id. at 1437.
101. The damage amount increases $50,000 each year until 2008. VA. CODE.
ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (2005).
102. Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191, 1194-95 (4th Cir. 1989).
103. Id. at 1193-94.
104. Id. at 1197.
105. Id. at 1196.
106. Id. at 1196-97.
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to look at any other type of review except for rational basis.' °7 The
court then concluded that there was a "reasonable relation to a valid
legislative purpose."'0 8 No violation was found.
Sixth Circuit
Michigan's noneconomic damages cap is different from those
previously mentioned. It has a $280,000 noneconomic cap in general,
but if the court determines that the plaintiff was severely injured, the
cap increases to $500,000.'09 Recently, the Sixth Circuit handed down a
decision concerning Michigan's cap in Smith v. Botsford General
Hospital."" The victim was Kelly Smith who died while being
transferred between hospitals."' Smith's estate was awarded an
astonishing five million dollars in noneconomic damages. " ' The cap
reduced that award to $359,000."'
The court first considered which level of scrutiny to apply. Citing
Boyd, the Sixth Circuit stated that the Michigan law was simply a form
of economic regulation and was, by default, entitled to only rational
basis review." 4 Then, very briefly, the court cited a Michigan appellate
court's review of the law and found that the cap was rationally related
107. See id. (quoting and citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental
Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978)) (such a classification can, prima facia, give a
federal statute automatic rational basis review in the federal court system); see also
infra pp. 25-26.
108. Boyd, 877 F.2d at 1197.
109. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.1483(1) (2005) (These serious injuries include:
(1) a result of the plaintiff as a hemiplegic, paraplegic, or quadriplegic, (2)
permanently impaired cognitive capacity or (3) "permanent loss of or damage to a
reproductive organ."). These numbers are also adjusted for inflation. Id. §
600.1483(4).
110. 419 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005).
111. Id. at 515-16 (Smith weighed about 600 pounds and was in a car accident.
The defendant-physician decided Smith needed to be transferred to a facility that
could accommodate a man of his size. The action was brought forth under the
federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) which
requires hospitals to stabilize patients before transferring them to another medical
facility).
112. Id. at 515.
113. Id. at 517 (stating that at the time of Smith's death, the cap was adjusted to
the higher amount); see also supra note 88.
114. Smith, 419 F.3d at 519-20. (This test, of whether the law controls an
economic activity, is a recent example of how the federal courts consistently
analyze damage cap laws). See also supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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to the purpose of controlling increases in health care costs. 15
Compared to the previous two examples from the circuit courts, the
Sixth Circuit's analysis was significantly shorter in length. Perhaps
such brevity means that this type of analysis of the issue is becoming
routine in the federal courts.
Compared with the decisions of state supreme courts, federal circuit
courts are more consistent in upholding the constitutionality of state
noneconomic damages caps. As mentioned earlier, as states have
attempted to repair the system, tensions between doctors and lawyers
have only risen."' With these factors in mind, some members on
Capitol Hill are calling for a national effort to control the situation;
these members of Congress believe that "a new paradigm," federal in
nature, is required."7 The following part looks at previous and current
federal efforts to fix the insurance debacle.
PART II: THE MODERN CONGRESS AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
REFORM
Past Federal Legislative Attempts
As mentioned above, medical malpractice tort reform is a politically
charged issue.1 " In recent history, the political divisions on the issue
have been consistent. Generally, Republicans back the medical
industry and advocate damages caps, while Democrats, who typically
support the trial lawyers, are against virtually all caps on a victim's
recovery."9 Republicans claim to put doctors and patients ahead of
115. Id. at 520 (quoting Zdrojewski v. Murphy, 657 N.W.2d 721, 739 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2002)) (The Michigan appellate court found that "[b]y limiting at least one
component of health care costs, the noneconomic damages limitation is rationally
related to its intended purpose."). Much like the Michigan appellate court, the
Sixth Circuit gives deference to the legislature and its rationale, see Zdrojewski,
657 N.W.2d at 739 (citing House Legislative Analysis, SB 270 and HB 4033, 4403,
4404, April 20, 1993, pp. 1-2).
116. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
117. See Gibeaut, supra note 1, at 44.
118. See supra pp. 1-2. See also Terry Carter, Tort Reform Texas Style, A.B.A.
J., at 32 (discussing the political divisions on medical malpractice tort reform in
general and in Texas' judiciary).
119. See Adams, Issue Redux, supra note 15; John Reichard, The Drip, Drip,
Drip of the Medical Malpractice Debate, CQ TODAY, Feb. 11, 2005,
http://www.cq.com (last visited Aug. 25, 2005). See generally Rebecca Adams &
Kate Schuler, Opposition to Shielding Drug Makers Makes Malpractice Bill a
Longer Shot, CQ WEEKLY - HEALTH, Jan. 10, 2005, http://www.cq.com (last visited
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trial lawyers.' 20 Conversely, Democrats point out how damages caps
will hurt those who are vulnerable and deserve just compensation.121
When the 1970s and 1980s medical malpractice crises emerged, both
Republicans and Democrats offered solutions. In the 1970s, bills were
introduced to merely explore the phenomenon of medical malpractice
lawsuits and the awards given to plaintiffs. 22 In the 1980s, however,
members of Congress were introducing bills directly dealing with the
losses that were involved in medical malpractice suits. 23 This shift in
what solutions were presented is probably a result of the new
affordability crisis that developed in the 1980s. 2 4 With the price of
malpractice insurance rising at that time, policymakers appeared to
turn towards the monetary aspect of the medical malpractice
predicament. Hence, the investigatory phase of the 1970s became a
problem that Congress dealt with from an economic standpoint.
In 1994, the control of the House of Representatives changed for the
first time in forty years. The Republican revolution of 1994 led to
Aug. 25, 2005) [hereinafter Adams, Longer Shot] (discussing why the Democrats
oppose malpractice damages caps). President George W. Bush is also a key
Republican who supports damages caps, id.; but see Medical Malpractice Reform
Act of 1985, H.R. 2659, 99th Cong. (1985) (proposing a $250,000 cap on
noneconomic damages, authored by a Democratic House member).
120. See Republican Nat'l Comm., 2004 Republican Party Platform: A Safer
World and a More Hopeful America 59 (2004), available at http://www.gop.com/
media/ 2004platform.pdf.
121. See Senator Patrick Leahy, Comments of Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.),
Ranking Member, Senate Judiciary Committee, on the President's Medical
Malpractice Proposal, Jan. 5, 2005,
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200501/010505a.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2006). The
Democrats have even made the issue political, claiming the George W. Bush
administration is proposing the caps in their zealous support for the large drug
companies; see ELI RESEARCH, Medical Liability Bill Passes House for Third Year
in a Row: Inaction by Senate Stalls Pain and Suffering Award Caps, MEDICINE &
HEALTH, Aug. 8, 2005, at 1, available at 2005 WLNR 22611955.
122. See, e.g., H.R. 5052, 93rd Cong. (1973) (a bill to establish a commission on
medical malpractice rewards); H.R. 6293, 94th Cong. (1975) (a bill to establish a
reinsurance program for medical malpractice awards); S. 1720, tit. V, 96th Cong.
(1979) (a bill to investigate the condition of malpractice insurance in America at
the time).
123. See, e.g., H.R. Res. 386, 99th Cong. (1986) (a resolution to reform state tort
law as to put caps on noneconomic losses in medical malpractice cases); Medical
Malpractice Reform Act of 1985, H.R. 2659, 99th Cong. (1985) (directs states to
place a $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages).
124. See supra pp. 5-6.
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GOP control of the House, leaving the Democrats powerless.15 Since
that time, the House GOP has proposed bills with noneconomic12• 127
damages caps.16 The Senate has also put forth its own solutions, but
has been unable to pass any of the House's bills.'2 8 The past eight bills
on malpractice caps have not been voted on by the Senate. 29 The same
is true of the current Congress. As will now be discussed, there are
bills in the 109th Congress that specifically call for caps on
noneconomic damages awarded in medical malpractice cases.
Current Federal Legislative Endeavors
There are currently a variety of bills concerning medical malpractice
caps before Congress.30 The three bills discussed below were chosen
for their adherence to past reform proposals on damages caps and
their chance of political success. As discussed earlier, the punitive and
noneconomic damages cap solution has been frequently suggested in
bills since the 1980s."' Even if the bills in the 109th Congress do not
become law, as some have suggested from both inside and outside of
125. The "Republican revolution" was important in that it enabled the
Republican Party to control the policy process in Congress. See John H. Aldrich &
David W. Rohde, The Republican Revolution and the House Appropriations
Committee, J. POL., Feb. 2000, at 1-33.
126. Most of these bills contained consistently recycled language. For example,
each session of Congress from the 104th to the 108th had a bill with a $250,000 cap.
See, e.g., H.R. 229, § 7, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 1091, § 204, 105th Cong. (1997);
H.R. 5344, § 4, 106th Cong. (2000); H.R. 1639, § 4, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 321, §
4, 108th Cong. (2003).
127. Senate versions usually adopt the language of their partner bill from the
House (or vice versa). These bills were also introduced by Republican members.
See, e.g., S. 11, § 202, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 1370, § 6, 107th Cong. (2001).
128. See Robert A. Levy, Constitutional Malpractice, THE AMERICAN PROWLER,
Apr. 22, 2003, available at http://www.cato.org/research/articles/levy-030422.html.
See e.g., H.R. 956, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 4600, 107th Cong. (2002). Both of
these bills passed in the House, but not the Senate. See Glassman, supra note 14,
at 422. See also H.R. 5, 108th Cong. (2003) [hereinafter H.R. 5, 108th] (this bill
passed in the House but was filibustered in the Senate).
129. Kate Schuler, House OKs Medical Liability Bill, CO WEEKLY, Aug. 1, 2005
[hereinafter Schuler, House OKs].
130. See, e.g., S. 1337, 109th Cong. (2005) (gives grants to states to develop
solutions to the medical malpractice crisis); H.R. 3378, 109th Cong. (2005)
($250,000 cap on noneconomic damages along with state grants). See also supra
note 15 and accompanying text.
131. See supra p. 2 and text accompanying note 103.
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Congress,' the three bills discussed below are of important academic
value. If Congress is able to pass medical malpractice reforms in the
future,' there is an excellent chance that the bills presented below
may become law. Therefore, the provisions in the following bills may
be potentially analyzed by the federal court system, including the
Supreme Court. It is important to gauge the Supreme Court's analysis
of such damages caps, particularly considering the various approaches
taken by other jurisdictions.
HEALTH ACT
H.R. 5, The Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare
Act (HEALTH Act) was introduced on July 21, 2005, in the House of
Representatives. 114 It was introduced by Republican Phil Gingery of
Georgia, and quickly passed by a vote of 230 to 194 only seven days
later, on July 28, 2005.' This bill is the furthest along in the 109th
Congress' legislative process, and is awaiting action by the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary.
36
The HEALTH Act contains a $250,000 cap on noneconomic and
punitive damages. 137 The bill also has a condition that "[n]o punitive
damages may be awarded against the manufacturer or distributor of a
medical product, or a supplier of any component . . ." that was
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) or deemed in
compliance with FDA statutes and regulations.' Other notable
features of the bill include a statute of limitations limiting when a
132. See Kate Schuler, House Passes Liability Overhaul Again, but Diagnosis
Shaky for Senate, CQ TODAY - HEALTH, July 28, 2005, http://www.cq.com
[hereinafter Schuler, Diagnosis Shaky] (the reform attempts will fail simply
because of the partisan political environment in the Senate).
133. The issue is considered an emergency by both sides involved in the debate.
See supra note 36 and accompanying text. There is a possibility that this
emergency will force the Senate to take action on the issue.
134. See H.R. 5, supra note 15.
135. Id. (as passed by House of Representatives, July 28, 2005).
136. THOMAS, "Search Results," Library of Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov/
cgi-bin/bdquery/ D?d109:1:./temp/-bdfq48:@@@RI /bss/ 109search.html (last visited
Jan. 13, 2006).
137. H.R. 5, supra note 15, §§ 4(b) & 7(b)(2). Punitive damages may not exceed
$250,000 or two times the amount of economic damages. Id, § 7(b)(2). If a state
already had a cap or subsequently enacts a cap for monetary damages, the bill will
not preempt state law. Id. § 11(c).
138. Id., § 7(c)(1).
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malpractice suit can be brought, a limitation of joint and several
liability and constraints on lawyers' contingency fees.1
39
Healthy America Act
S. 4, the Healthy America Act of 2005 was introduced on July 27,
2005, by Senator Bill Frist of Tennessee.' 40 The fact that Senator Frist
introduced this bill is important for two reasons. First, Senator Frist is
a medical doctor, and he has cited his own medical credentials when
promoting the bill. Second, and more importantly, Senator Frist is
the majority leader for the Republican Party in the Senate. By
utilizing his power as majority leader,1 42 Frist gave medical malpractice
reform additional attention.' 43 Frist's devotion to the Act showcases
the Republican Party's commitment to medical malpractice reform.
While the Healthy America Act contains the significant features of
the HEALTH Act,'44  the Healthy America Act is more
139. See generally, Henry Cohen, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LIABILITY REFORM: H.R. 5, 109TH CONGRESS (July 29,
2005) (on file with author) (provides a summation of H.R. 5).
140. S. 4, supra note 15.
141. See Bill Frist, M.D., Spotlight on Healthcare, http://frist.senate.gov/
index.cfm?FuseAction=IssuesLegislation.SpotlightOnHealthcare (last visited Jan.
13, 2006)
As a heart and lung transplant surgeon, my life has been dedicated to
improving individuals' lives through advances in health care. As a United
States Senator, I am able to take the principles I learned as a physician...
and apply them to my work on health care reform. While I continue to
treat patients on an individual basis, I now have the privilege of being able
to treat the collective health of the nation.
142. The Senate majority leader is the most powerful and influential member in
that chamber. In the Senate, the leader sets the agenda, speaks for his party and
promotes cohesion for his party. WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL
PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 21 (6th ed., CQ Press 2004).
143. As majority leader, Frist took medical malpractice reform and packaged it
with other GOP health care proposals for the 109th Congress. See Kate Schuler,
Frist Health Package Touts GOP Perenials to Curb Rising Costs and Uninsured,
CQ TODAY, 26 Sept. 2005, available at http://www.cq.com [hereinafter Schuler,
Frist Health Package]. This package is still a priority of Frist in the second session
of the 109th. See Kate Schuler, Frist Plans to Revive a Plethora of Health Bills, But
Many Have Already Floundered, CQ TODAY, 1 Feb. 2006, available at
http://www.cq.com.
144. Compare H.R. 5, supra note 15, §§ 3-8 with S. 4, supra note 15, tit. I, subtit.
A. Many legislative endeavors have similar bills in the other chamber as they go
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comprehensive. In addition to the HEALTH Act's noneconomic
damage cap, the Healthy America Act, inter alia, would create a
national office for the coordination of health information technology,145
tax breaks within the health care industry,146 loan repayment programs
for medical students, 14' and additional aid to community health
148centers. The Healthy America Act may be more appealing
considering not only who introduced it, but also what it includes. The
Healthy America Act may be more palatable to some Democrats due
to its multifaceted approach towards the health care system.
Senate Bill 354 (the HEALTH Act)
S. 354, also known as the HEALTH Act of 2005,149 is worthy of
attention. The HEALTH Act of 2005 has the same key features of the
previous HEALTH Act and the Healthy America Act, namely a
$250,000 cap on noneconomic damages.5 An important difference is
that the HEALTH Act of 2005 does not have the lawsuit exemption
available to entities with items approved by the Food and Drug
Administration. 151 The Food and Drug Administration lawsuit
exemption is important because many opponents of the HEALTH Act
have pointed to the immunity as a reason to oppose the bill.
52
Further, this exemption was not received well by some members of the
Republican Party, as well as by health care providers.15 The
HEALTH Act of 2005 may have more appeal than the base proposal
in the HEALTH Act without the Food and Drug Administration
lawsuit immunity.
To summarize, the major bills concerning medical malpractice
reform all contain a $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages. No
matter what the amount is, however, similar cap levels have posed
legal troubles for state legislatures. State supreme courts have had
various methods of treating constitutional guarantees of equal
through the legislative process. See ROGER H. DAVIDSON & WALTER J. OLESZEK,
CONGRESS & ITS MEMBERS 238 (10th ed. CQ Press 2006).
145. Id. § 2902.
146. Id. tit. 11.
147. Id. § 333.
148. Id. tit. 3, subtit. A.
149. It is able to have the same title as H.R. 5 because it is a bill in a different
chamber, the Senate.
150. Compare S. 354, supra note 15, §§ 4-9 with H.R. 5, supra note 15, §§ 3-8.
151. See H.R. 5 § 7(c); S.4, supra note 15, § 107(c).
152. See Schuler, House Oks, supra note 129.
153. See Adams, Longer Shot, supra note 119.
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protection. Although one can say that it is difficult to forecast how the
Supreme Court of the United States would specifically handle such a
varied response from the states if a federal cap is enacted, there is
applicable Supreme Court jurisprudence on this issue which may shed
some light on the future. In the next part, it will be examined whether
such a cap would be a problem if placed before the Supreme Court.
PART III: A PROPOSED FEDERAL DAMAGE CAP & THE EQUAL
PROTECTION GUARANTEES OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.. is considered a crucial cornerstone of
American civil liberties."' The importance of the EPC has been
highlighted by challengers to the state damage cap laws in the cases
above, and others.5 6 In fact, in the cases previously discussed, similar
state constitutional provisions were cited with their respective versions
of the EPC
5 7
Yet, as seen in the language of the EPC, its protections were rightly
used against state denial of equal protection in the aforementioned
cases. If a federal court were to examine a federal cap, however, the
EPC clause, on its own, would not suffice. The Fourteenth
Amendment is applied to the federal government via the Fifth
Amendment;5 8 therefore, any analysis of a federal cap will also be
subject to Equal Protection Clause treatment.
154. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
155. See generally WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM
POLITICAL PRINCIPAL TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (Harvard University Press 1988)
(asserting that the Fourteenth Amendment attained its special prominence in
American and judicial history by developing important constitutional rights); but
see David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 1457 (2001) (arguing that considering the development of the law and
tradition, the amendments to the Constitution were not necessary to change social
order).
156. See e.g., Hoffman 767 F.2d, at n.2; Carson, 424 A.2d, at 830.
157. See, e.g., Gourley 663 N.W.2d 43 (arguing that the cap violated the equal
protection clause of the Nebraska Constitution); Hoffman, 767 F.2d 1431 (arguing
that the cap violated the equal protection clause of the California Constitution).
158. The Fifth Amendment assures all citizens that "[no person shall] be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .. " U.S. CONST.
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The Supreme Court has never taken a state damages cap case on its
merits. The closest the Supreme Court has been in expressing its views
was in the sole dissenting opinion by Justice White for a dismissal of
appeal. 9 The case involved EPC concerns for California's cap. The
appeal was dismissed because there was no substantial federal
question; however, Justice White, in dissent, makes an astute
observation about the issues surrounding state damages caps. He
notes that there is much division among the states on whether a
noneconomic damage cap violates one's equal protection and due
process rights.16° Justice White states that this occurrence, coupled
with an emerging medical malpractice crisis, should have provided
ample justification for the Court to take up the matter on the merits. 16'
Nonetheless, the Court never provided any useful analysis for the topic
at hand.
Yet there is still an applicable area of jurisprudence that has been
formulated by the Court. When generally performing EPC analysis,
the Supreme Court has recognized that a disputed law could fall into
several categories, depending on its subject matter.1 62  Concerning
medical malpractice caps, an important category is that of tort reform,
particularly with regard to the limitations placed on defendant liability.
amend. V. The Supreme Court has held that "the concepts of equal protection [in
the Fourteenth Amendment] and due process [from the Fifth Amendment], both
stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive."
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); see also Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S.
163, 168 (1964) ("[W]hile the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection
clause, it does forbid discrimination that is 'so unjustifiable as to be violative of due
process."') (quoting Bolling 347 U.S. at 499).
159. Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 474 U.S. 892 (1985), dismissing appeal
from 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985).
160. Fein, 474 U.S. 892 (White, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 894.
162. Just within the context of a person's status are the categories of race and
sex. See Stephanie M. Wildman, Privilege, Gender, and the Fourteenth
Amendment: Reclaiming Equal Protection of the Laws, 13 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS.
L. REV. 707, 710 (2004). There are also other areas such as free speech, see
Alexander Gruber & Barbara Kritchevsky, The Uneasy Coexistence of Equal
Protection and Free Speech Claims in the Public Employment Context, 31 U. MEM.
L. REV. 559, 586-606 (2001), and even where one lives, see generally Gerald L.
Neuman, Territorial Discrimination, Equal Protection and Self Determination, 135
U. PENN. L. REV. 261 (1987) (arguing that geographical status is not to be excluded
from EPC analysis). The list continues. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 48,
§ 14.3 (economic and tax classifications, mandatory retirement laws, mental status,
etc.).
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This specific tort reform category has triggered a rational basis review
by the Supreme Court."'
Any cap on an award for medical malpractice, whether on punitive
or noneconomic damages, is clearly a limitation on the liability of the
defendant. The tortfeasor, even if found responsible, is not necessarily
responsible for the damages a judge or jury finds as being proportional
to his or her actions. Although the Supreme Court has yet to hear a
case concerning caps on medical malpractice damages, there are
analogous cases in the category of liability limitations.
An important case in this category is Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Environmental Study Group, Inc.'64 In Duke Power a federal cap
found in the Price-Anderson Act was at issue.' With many private
organizations refraining from investing in nuclear power plants,
Congress passed the Act to encourage the developments of such
plants.' 66 Even though the risk of a nuclear catastrophe was minute,
private investors did not want to be left vulnerable to that chance,
which would entail a considerable amount of money. 67 To do so, the
Act placed a $560 million cap on damages for which a plant could be
held liable.' 6 The District Court for the Western District of North
Carolina held that this law violated the Equal Protection Clause, via
the Fifth Amendment, because the Price-Anderson Act put the cost of
sustaining the country's nuclear power industry "on an arbitrarily
chosen segment of society, those injured by nuclear catastrophe.'
69
State medical malpractice caps have been attacked on similar
grounds. 170
163. See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
164. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
165. Id. at 64-65.
166. Id. at 64.
167. See id.
168. Id. at 65. Of note is that the cap was a combination of the maximum
amount of private insurance and up to $500 million of indemnification by the
federal government. Id. at 64-65. Nonetheless, there was still a cap on liability for
the private entity.
169. Id. at 82 (quoting Carolina Envtl. Study Group v. U.S. Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 431 F.Supp. 203, 225).
170. See e.g., Carson, 424 A.2d, at 830 ("The plaintiffs argue ... that [the cap]
improperly singles out victims of medical negligence, as distinct from victims of
other kinds of negligence"); Hoffman, 767 F. 2d, at 1433 ("The court found that
[the cap] ... discriminated between medical malpractice victims with noneconomic
losses that exceed $250,000 and all other tort victims with noneconomic losses ..
."). The only difference is that the classifications allegedly created in the state cap
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With this categorization in mind, the Court conducted a due process
analysis.' The Court first determined which standard of review was
appropriate. To make this assessment, Chief Justice Warren Burger
needed to determine the nature of the Act: was it a law of economic
regulation or a regulation that involved the fundamental rights of the• 72
plaintiffs? This determination was crucial because if the law was an
economic regulation, it deserved rational basis review, and thus "the
traditional presumption of constitutionality generally accorded. . . and
that it be upheld absent proof of arbitrariness or irrationality on the
part of Congress. '1 73 Conversely, as the appellees argued, if the law
involved interests "more important than those in the economic due
process and business oriented cases," then the Court would utilize a
higher standard of review. 174 In examining the legislative history of the
Act, the Court saw it as an economic regulation and thus applied
rational basis review.
1 75
Yet the issue does not end here; the Duke Power Court continued to
look at the law, as an economic regulation, under the rational basis
test. The Court found that the liability limitation was necessary to
''encourage private industry participation and hence bears a rational
relationship to Congress' concern for stimulating"1 6 such participation.
The Court then specifically analyzed the $560 million cap to see if it
was an "acceptable method for Congress to utilize in encouraging the
private development"'77 of nuclear energy. The cap was justified by its
reasonableness and support from experts in the nuclear energy field. 78
The cap was found to be rational and not arbitrary as liability
cases were not highlighted as being "arbitrarily chosen." Nevertheless, all of these
classifications consist of individuals who are economically limited in a negligence
claim.
171. The Court utilized the term "due process" throughout its analysis,
however, it later stated that due process and equal protection arguments are
synonymous. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 93.
172. Id. at 82-83.
173. Id.
174. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 83. Within this argument, the appellees appear to
be attempting to define their class. If a class is seen as suspect or a fundamental
right of that class is affected, strict scrutiny of the law must be used. See supra n.
49. The alternative given by the appellees tried to show that those who were
capped at $560 million had a fundamental right affected.
175. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 82-83.
176. Id. at 84.
177. Id. at 86.
178. Id. at 89-90.
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limitation."9 It therefore did not violate the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In carefully reading Duke Power, two crucial tenets emerge that are
applicable to federal malpractice caps. First, a federal cap on
noneconomic damages would almost certainly be viewed automatically
as an economic regulation, thus calling for rational basis review. A
Justice would not even have to look at the legislative history of such a
bill.' 80 The findings and purpose sections of the bills discussed above in
Part II, as well as those most likely to be proposed in the future
contain ample evidence for the Court to classify the bills as economic
in nature. For example, there is the use of Congress' power under the-, 181
Commerce Clause, which implicitly involves trade and financial
matters between the states.'8 2 Additionally, these bills attempt to deal
with the effects of the medical malpractice crisis on the cost of health
care and federal spending. Such an intent by the bill is, prima facia,
an economic regulation.I84 Therefore, such a cap will almost certainly
be given the rational basis review.""
Second, after Duke Power, legislation that is challenged as denying
equal protection is generally presumed to be valid."" The Supreme
Court will only hold such a statute unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause if it does not rest "on grounds wholly irrelevant to
the achievement of the State's objective."' 8 7 Congress has recognized a
legitimate goal in the bills relevant to this discussion: to reduce medical
insurance premiums and thus increase patient access to health care
179. See id. at 86-87.
180. Such legislative history includes hearing transcripts, committee reports,
and floor debates. In fact, the committee report on H.R. 5 (from the 108th
Congress) treats the cap as a key factor in the economics of the malpractice
insurance system. See H.R. REP. No. 108-32, pt. 1, at 21, 38 (2003).
181. Congress has power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
182. See H.R. 5, supra note 15, § 2(a)(2); S. 4, supra note 15, § 102(a)(2).
183. See H.R. 5, supra note 15, § 2(a)(1); S. 4, supra note 15, § 102(a)(1).
184. See H.R. 5, supra note 15, § 2(a)(3); S. 4, supra note 15, § 102(a)(3).
185. The Court could also look to previous federal precedent that has already
classified similar state caps as deserving rational basis review and not strict scrutiny
or intermediate review. See e.g., Hoffman, 767 U.S. at 1435.
186. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439-40
(1985).
187. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
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through, inter alia, a damage cap.' There is ample evidence provided
by Congress that shows how a medical malpractice cap may be
necessary to reach these particular goals.
Segments of the legislative branch have presented evidence that
there most likely is a link between insurance premiums and high jury
awards in medical malpractice cases. A recent House Judiciary
Committee report on the HEALTH Act is an excellent starting point.
The report has an abundant number of referrals to statistics on
insurance premiums and jury awards drawn from business magazines,
medical liability reports, and insurance industry reports."',
Additionally, in 2004, the Congressional Budget Office, an
independent and nonpolitical arm of Congress, reported that
"[e]vidence from the states indicates that premiums for malpractice
insurance are lower when tort liability is restricted than they would be
otherwise.' 9 More specifically, Congress' Joint Economic Committee
stated in 2003 that when medical malpractice insurance decreases in
cost, the practice of defensive medicine also declines, and the amount
of the number of Americans with health insurance increases. 91 The
Committee also noted that medical malpractice reforms, such as caps
on noneconomic damages will "reduce health care spending by 5
percent to 9 percent," a savings of billions of dollars.192 These several
findings will only bolster the Supreme Court's finding that there is a
close and rational relationship between the means and the goal
expressed by Congress.9
When looking at the totality of this evidence, the Court will almost
certainly see a legitimate goal set by Congress that can rationally be
attained by placing caps on noneconomic damages. The Court, under
rational basis review, should not demand of Congress an explanation
of its purpose or rationale for enacting such damages caps.' 94 Further,
188. See H.R. 5, supra note 15, § 2; S. 4, supra note 15, § 102. See also JOINT
ECON. COMM., supra note 9, at 12-14, 19.
189. H.R. REP. No. 108-32, pt. 1, at nn. 1, 66 & 85.
190. CBO, supra note 3, at 1, 5-6. CBO also admits, however, that "[e]ven large
savings in premiums can have only a small direct impact on health care spending-
private or governmental-because malpractice costs account for less than 2
percent of that spending." Id. at 1.
191. JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 9, at 22-23.
192. Id. at 19, 23.
193. But see Gfell, supra note 20, at 799.
194. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15 (1992) ("To be sure, the Equal
Protection Clause does not demand for purposes of rational-basis review that a
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the Court has stated that they will not pass judgment on the
legislature's wisdom, so long as it passes rational basis review.' 9'
Specifically, in the area of economic regulation, the Congress does not
run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause and the Fifth Amendment
"merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If
the classification has some 'reasonable basis,' it does not offend the
Constitution simply because the classification 'is not made with
mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some
inequity.' ' 196 Based on this Supreme Court jurisprudence it will be
extremely difficult to strike down federal medical malpractice damages
caps simply because they discriminate against victims whose tort
caused more than $250,000 (or whatever determined amount) in
noneconomic damages, and victims whose tort awards total less.
CONCLUSION
The liability system for medical malpractice cases is in need of
repair. 97 Whether the cause of such disarray is from high jury awards
or higher health care industry operating costs, or both, proponents and
opponents of medical malpractice reform agree that the status quo is
less than ideal.'9 In order to relieve the stress on the health care
industry, some have suggested limiting damages given for
noneconomic loss, commonly known as "pain and suffering." Several
state legislatures have enacted caps on noneconomic damages. In turn,
state courts have given mixed reviews of these laws when challenged as
not providing guarantees of equal protection under the law. 9 Federal
courts have been far less inconsistent when examining state damages
200
caps. Yet, for the most part, federal district and circuit courts have
upheld these damages caps under rational basis review.
Considering an impending crisis and the mixed reactions to these
state laws, the Republican-controlled Congress made attempts at
legislature or governing decisionmaker actually articulate at any time the purpose
or rationale supporting its classification.").
195. See Schweiker v. Wilson 450 U.S. 221, 234 (1981) ("The Court has said
that, although this rational-basis standard is 'not a toothless one,' it does not allow
us to substitute our personal notions of good public policy for those of Congress..
." (citation omitted)).
196. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (quoting Lindsley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)).
197. See JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 9, at 24.
198. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
199. See supra Part I.B.
200. See supra Part I.C.
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enacting a federal cap on damages awarded in medical malpractice
201
cases. These bills are using recycled language and will almost
certainly be included when Congress finalizes and passes a medical
malpractice reform bill.
When looking at this language, in all likelihood, trial lawyers and
medical malpractice victims in danger of receiving limited damages,
will challenge a federal cap under the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution. As shown, the Supreme Court should
uphold a federal cap on noneconomic damages under the EPC. This
conclusion can be verified through both the federal courts' case law in
regard to similar state damages caps2 ° and the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence concerning federal limitations on liability in other fields
of federal regulation . If Congress ultimately decides to enact a cap
on damages and overcomes the legislative gridlock, ° it appears that
the EPC will mount little opposition to such a cap in the Supreme
Court.
201. The caps have been targeted at both punitive and noneconomic damages
regularly since the Republicans took Congress in 1994. See supra Part ILA, I.B.
202. See supra Part I.C.
203. See supra Part Il.
204. See supra p. 17 and accompanying notes.
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